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INJUNCTIVE

Plaintiff sought an injunction restraining defendant from using its
corporate name in insuring real estate titles in the District of Columbia. The
corporate names of plaintiff and defendant are identical except for the difference
between the words "company" and "corporation." Plaintiff is a District of
Columbia corporation organized in I 896 under the name "Lawyers Title
Insurance Company." Defendant was incorporated in Virginia in 1925 under
the name "Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation." From 1896 to 1922 plaintiff
conducted its business entirely independently. In later years it made a "working
agreement" with two other District title companies. A majority of the stock
of these three corporations is now held by a fourth, the Consolidated Title
Company. All these corporations under the "working agreement" have identical
employees. Only the profits are kept in separate bank accounts from which each
pays it own dividends, taxes and license fees. The findings of fact state that
plaintiff and its associates are called generally by the public, "the District Title
Company," and that plaintiff is not referred to in business circles as "the Lawyers Title Insurance Company," and that there is no evidence that plaintiff
ever acquired a reputation under that name alone. Held, plaintiff abandoned the
right of exclusive use of its name by associating with other corporations under
a holding company and engaging in the same business under a conglomerate
name. Lawyers Title Insurance Company v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, (App. D. C. 1939) 109 F. (2d) 35, cert. denied (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct.
806.
The case involves no· deliberate attempt by one competitor to simulate another or crafty scheme for luring away business by deception. Both parties have
conducted themselves honorably. The only question is whether plaintiff has an
exclusive right, by virtue of prior appropriation in the District, to use the name
which each has acquired lawfully and with honest purpose. It is universally
recognized that a corporation may restrain the imitation of its corporate name
where unfair competition will result.1 But where the use of the name does not
RELIEF -

1 Federal Securities Co. v. Federal Securities Corp., 129 Ore. 375, 276 P.
(1929).
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amount to unfair competition, there is some uncertainty as to the exclusive right
to a corporate name. In most jurisdictions there are statutes which forbid the
adoption by a corporation of a name so similar to that of another corporation
as to be misleading or productive of confusion. 2 In such states the question of
availability of a proposed corporate name is determined in the first instance by
the secretary of state. As a matter of courtesy on the part of the department of
state, this determination may be obtained upon request in advance of organization, and although the ruling of the secretary of state is not final, it is given
due weight by the courts. 3 The purpose of these statutes has been well expressed
as follows: "Courts of equity are frequently called upon to remedy conditions
which grow out of the use by a corporation of a name similar to the name of
another corporation, carrying on a business of the same character. In such cases
it is usually, if not always, true that relief is granted because experience has
demonstrated that the public is misled, and the corporation first established is
defrauded on account of the similarity of the names. We assume that the statutes
referred to were intended to prevent, to some extent, the conditions which, in
such cases, when they arise, make a resort to the courts necessary." 4 However,
it is not necessary to have such a statute in order to obtain relief, as a corporation is entitled to protection upon general common-law principles. At common
law, corporate names are protected against their unauthorized use by others only
where one corporation is attempting to palm off its goods on the public as those
of another corporation.5 Therefore actual competition becomes an important
factor where there is no statute in effect. A corporate name is looked upon as
being essentially a trade name or a tradl! mark when used in connection with
the business of the corporation.6 And when the question of imitation of a cor2 E.g., Mich. Pub. Acts (1931), No. 327, § 6: "No corporation shall assume
any name ..• already in use by any other existing corporation of this state, or corporation lawfully carrying on business in this state, or so nearly similar thereto as to lead
to confusion or deception••••" See also WILGUS and HAMILTON, MICHIGAN CoRPoRATION LAw 72-78 (1932).
Other states have similar provisions: Del. Rev. Code (1935), § 2037; Ill. Stat.
Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. 32, § 157.10; N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1929),
bk. 22, "General Corporation Law," § 9; Ohio Gen. Code (Throckmorton, 1930),
§ 8623-5.
8 Young & Chaffee Furniture Co. v. Chaffee Brothers Furniture Co., 204 Mich.
293, 170 N. W. 48 (1918).
4 66 A. L. R. 948 at 952 (1930). Where the statute only prohibits the adoption
of an identical name, a court of equity will carry out the purpose of the legislature and
enjoin the use of similar names, also. Cleveland Opera Co. v. Cleveland Civic Opera
Assn., 22 Ohio App. 400, 154 N. E. 352 (1926).
5 Standard Oilshares Inc. v. Standard Oil Group, 17 Del. Ch. II3, 150 A.
174 (1930); Good Housekeeping Shop v. Smitter, 254 Mich. 592, 236 N. W. 872
(1931).
6 American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372; 46 S. Ct. 160 (1926).
In Holmes, Booth & Haydens v. Holmes, Booth & Atwood Mfg. Co., 37 Conn. 278
at 293 ( l 870), the court said: "The law having authorized the selection of a name,
and having declared the name so selected to be the name of the corporation, we see no
reason why the law should not protect the corporation in the use of that name, upon
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porate name comes up in an injunction suit, the courts look upon it as being
similar to a question of unfair competition. 7 It is usually necessary to show that
there has actually been confusion, but some courts have said that where the
names were so similar as to lead to probable confusion, relief would be allowed. 8
But it should be remembered that it is the business of the plaintiff corporation
that is being protected and not a right to the exclusive use of its name alone.
The business and good will and not the name itself are protected. And therefore only where there is unfair competition will the courts grant an injunction.
However, as pointed out before, by statute in some states .corporations have been
granted a property right in the name alone and no need of showing actual competition is necessary.9
John L. Rubsam

the same principles, and to the same extent, that individuals are protected in the use
of trade-marks."
7 Federal Securities Co. v. Federal Securities Corp., 129 Ore. 375, 276 P. II00
(1929).
8 Metal Craft Co. v. Metalcraft Heater Corp., 255 Mich. 642, 239 N. W. 364
(1931).
9 For complete collection of cases on this question, see 66 A. L. R. 948 (1930),
and II5 A. L. R. 1241 (1938); 6 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, §§ 24252432 (1931).

